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In an essay of at least 500 words,

Summarize findings of the attached scholarly article that addresses the degree to which CSR influences the corporate bottom line.

  1. Explain how your research did or did not affect whether you agree with the shareholder or stakeholder perspectives. 

1.Summarize findings of one scholarly article that addresses the degree to which CSR influences the

 

corporate bottom line.

 

2.Explain how your research did or did not affect whether you agree with the shareholder or stakeholder

 

perspectives as identified in this lesson. 1. Introduction In 2013, a Coca-Cola television advertisement claimed that proper labeling, sugar substitutes, and

 

portion control make it possible to be healthy while consuming Coke products. This prompted one

 

YouTube user to voice over the advertisement1 in a way that attacks the company's original message

 

with information about safety of the sugar substitutes that they use and the health risks associated with

 

consuming Coke products, featuring the message that not all calories are created equal. The satirical

 

advertisement also points a finger at Coca-Cola for being a cause of the obesity epidemic. The video

 

went viral, and while it is unclear if or how this affected sales, the message certainly reached an

 

enormous international audience. The Coca-Cola advertisement voiceover is just one example of how

 

major players in the packaged food industry have taken hits to their reputations as a result of modern

 

outlets of communication.

 

Firms are losing control of their image. Perhaps this is one reason that Corporate Social Responsibility

 

(CSR) has become a buzzword among packaged food industry leaders like Coca-Cola ? firms seem

 

determined to show their stakeholders that they have values and behave responsibly, and that they are

 

driven by more than just the prospect of financial gain. For this reason, they produce elaborate annual

 

sustainability reports in which they meticulously account for their CSR efforts (see Shnayder et al., 2015).

 

According to the literature, it is unlikely that CSR is actually intrinsically motivated by the values of firms.

 

First, CSR is a multidimensional construct most often perceived to be divisible into three categories:

 

people, planet and profit ? the so-called ?Triple Bottom Line? (3BL) (Elkington, 1997). This view of CSR

 

was born as a policy guideline, but has also been used as a basis for theory in the literature (see Nikolaou

 

et al., 2013). The existence of a ?profit? category, which captures financial gain, already demonstrates

 

that values alone cannot be responsible for CSR. While some studies find an intrinsic component to CSR

 

motivation (see Graafland and Mazereeuw-Van der Duijn Schouten, 2012) the theoretical perspectives

 

on the topic, particularly for larger firms, support the idea that the choice to engage in CSR is not

 

motivated intrinsically (see Garriga and Melé, 2004 for an overview). Some CSR theories focus on selfserving behavior based on the idea that the responsibilities of firms are purely economic. One example is

 

Cause Related Marketing, which suggests that the point of CSR is to encourage customers to engage in

 

revenue-providing exchanges (Varadarajan and Menon, 1988). Other perspectives are based on a specific

 

or contextually limited focus such as human rights (see Cassel, 2001); or on the role of the firm in

 

society, where society is defined only in terms of a specific group of stakeholders (Mahon and McGowan,

 

1991 and Velasquez, 1992); or focus only on pre-defined responsibilities (see Davis, 1967 and Logsdon and Wood, 2002), thereby limiting the perspective of the approach. Despite their differences, one

 

commonality between all of the approaches is that CSR is motivated by the organizational environment

 

and as such, not by the existence of intrinsic values within a firm. The relationship between this

 

organizational environment and different dimensions of CSR remains largely unexplored. Gaining insight

 

into this relationship is vital if we are to understand what motivates CSR.

 

This paper aims to uncover how self-reported motivations for different dimensions of CSR can be

 

explained by different aspects of the organizational environment. To accomplish this aim, we empirically

 

classify self-reported CSR motivations according to frameworks that we derive from the literature. We

 

first classify the motivations for CSR according to the Triple Bottom Line. The organizational environment

 

is often conceptualized to consist of institutions that affect the organization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983

 

and North, 2005) and stakeholders that affect the organization (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). We use a

 

combination of Institutional Theory (IT) and Stakeholder Management (SM) to explain these motivations.

 

From IT, we use Scott (1995) three pillars to determine the regulative, normative, or cultural-cognitive

 

nature of the identified motivations. From SM, we use Clarkson (1995) stakeholder categories to

 

investigate how and to what extent different types of stakeholders influence packaged food firms. We

 

thereby follow the suggestion by Aguinis and Glavas (2012) to combine different levels of analysis to

 

explain CSR ? in this case, institutional and organizational.

 

Empirically, we use qualitative methods to study the packaged food industry in the context of the

 

aforementioned theory. We base our conclusions on self-reported motivations from a combination of

 

annual CSR reports and oral interviews. In doing so, we take a bottom-up approach, looking to the

 

packaged food firms themselves to help us further investigate their motivations for CSR.

 

Understanding motivations for CSR is of particular importance in the packaged food industry. Firms in

 

this remarkably large industry are few, influential, and difficult to avoid. With the industry's great

 

lobbying power, legislation is not always an effective means of regulating behavior. Packaged food firms

 

have the resources and political influence to impact legislation and influence it's direction (Nestle, 2007,

 

pp92). A clearer understanding of the conditions under which firms choose to participate in responsible

 

initiatives and make responsible choices can help policy makers to manipulate those conditions to

 

encourage such behavior, while decreasing time and resources spent battling these firms on the

 

legislative front.

 

In the following sections of this paper, we will discuss different frameworks and complimentary theories

 

for CSR, and show how we arrived at SM and IT as the most fitting context in which to analyze CSR

 

motivations. We then discuss our empirical methods, demonstrate our results, and finish with some

 

concluding remarks. 2. The industry

 

We define packaged food as foods that are, to at least some extent, processed such as convenience

 

foods, chips and cookies, frozen foods, pastas, sauces, oils and spices, and much more. Though we limit our definition to foods that have been processed, we choose to use the term ?packaged food? over

 

?processed food? because it relates to all relevant foods equally and helps to mitigate health-related

 

biases associated with processed foods. Empirically, we chose to limit our study to the packaged food

 

industry because it serves as an important case in demonstrating the capacity of SM and IT to explain

 

CSR behavior that firms claim to be intrinsically motivated. As a remarkably large and influential industry,

 

understanding the motivations for CSR in packaged food can have positive social implications, in addition

 

to serving as a case to demonstrate the theoretical framework from which we can continue to study CSR.

 

There are a myriad of features that separate this industry as an exemplary case.

 

One distinguishing feature is enormity of size. Forbes Magazine estimates the worth of the packaged

 

food industry at almost $1.6 trillion (Murray, 2007). Numbers that large imply strong public influence as

 

they show that consumers are truly dependent on the industry's products, making accountability by

 

packaged food firms exceptionally important (Nestle, 2007). Perhaps more crucially, globalization and

 

the worldwide spread of western urbanized lifestyles ensure that the industry will continue to grow in

 

coming years (Murray, 2007). This ensures that there is a lot of money to be made for the few huge

 

multinational food companies with very concentrated market power that make up this industry (Stuckler

 

and Nestle, 2012). In addition to its uniquely large size and potential for growth, the packaged food industry enjoys the

 

benefit of unwavering demand. Simply put, everyone must eat, and because of the aforementioned

 

spread of western urbanized lifestyles, subsistence farming is no longer our day-to-day. As such,

 

patronizing the packaged food industry has become very difficult to avoid without significant and

 

inconvenient lifestyle changes. Eating packaged food is easy, while avoiding it requires effort and

 

forethought. The few huge multinational packaged food companies (all of whom enjoy very

 

concentrated market power) reap the benefits of this (Stuckler and Nestle, 2012). Beyond their inherent

 

presence in the lives of consumers, these firms are also essential to the survival of their supply chain

 

partners. Armed with this knowledge, they wield this power for financial gain (Oxfam, 2013).

 

Another separating factor is that packaged foods, in particular those that are ultra-processed, have

 

pointedly longer supply chains as compared to industries for most other commercial goods. It is not

 

uncommon for ultra-processed snack foods to contain thirty or forty ingredients, each of which contains

 

its own supply chain. Chains this large can be difficult to manage, as it is virtually impossible to control

 

the ongoing processes at each individual stage. This makes it difficult to accurately guarantee values like

 

healthiness, environmental friendliness, or human rights throughout the supply chain.

 

The final distinguishing feature of this industry that we discuss is that food is different from most other

 

consumer products because we ingest it. This brings forward ethical issues that go beyond economics

 

such as human health, disease risk, and quality of life. Some components of food such as fat, sugar, and

 

salt, have been directly linked to negative physical effects on the human body (Poirier et al., 2006), but

 

there is also a psychological component to consider. Foods that are high in sugar and other refined

 

sweeteners, refined carbohydrates, fat, salt, and caffeine have been shown to cause addiction, which leads to an overconsumption of these items and perpetuates the cycle of physical and psychological

 

damage (Ifland et al., 2009).

 

These features mean that industry has a wide range of stakeholders worldwide, and is subject to many

 

different institutional pressures. This makes the packaged food industry a prime example of a

 

stakeholder management and institutional context. In addition, it also shares characteristics with other

 

large and influential sectors, such as energy or pharmaceuticals, which allows for some level of

 

generalization. This makes it a clear and comprehensible example for future researchers looking to study

 

motivations for CSR among influential firms in other large industries. 3. Theory

 

In this section, we discuss the dimensions of Corporate Social Responsibility and how firms are

 

motivated to engage in CSR practices. Following Campbell (2007), we define CSR using two criteria: (1)

 

Knowingly doing no harm to stakeholders; and (2) Rectifying unknowingly done harm as soon as it is

 

discovered. The broadness of this definition allows for a high level of inclusion. This is important because

 

a limited definition of CSR restricts the discussion of motivations for CSR to motivations for behaviors

 

that fit within the limited definition. This can be particularly concerning when definitions of CSR differ

 

between science, industry, and government. It inadvertently prompts the three to work towards

 

different goals, even when the intention to collaborate is there. More specific definitions of CSR are quite

 

prevalent in the literature (see Moir, 2001 and Wood, 1991) and in policy (Commission of the European

 

Communities, 2002), with countless additional definitions and adaptations thereof being used by firms

 

on their websites and in sustainability reporting.

 

Methodologically, we gravitate towards the broad for two reasons. First, a broad definition is in line with

 

our bottom-up approach. Since we are dealing with self-reported motivations for self-reported CSR

 

behavior, a broad definition of CSR allows us to include everything that the firm reports without setting

 

theoretical boundaries or limitations. A more restrictive definition could force us to exclude motivations

 

for behaviors that were reported by the firms as responsible but did not fit with that particular definition

 

of CSR, thereby contradicting our bottom-up approach. Second, Campbell uses this definition to offer an

 

institutional perspective on CSR, which is consistent with our own theoretical framework. This is

 

supported by other authors in the field of CSR (see, for example, De Villiers et al., 2014).

 

We continue by introducing the Triple Bottom Line as a framework for classifying motivations. We then

 

discuss stakeholder management and the role of stakeholders as actors in motivating CSR behaviors.

 

Finally, we talk about the concept of institutions, how they arise, and the pressures that they put on

 

firms. 3.1. Categorizing CSR motivations: the triple bottom line The Triple Bottom Line (Elkington, 1997) is widely used in the management literature to classify CSR

 

behaviors. It is based on the idea by sustainability consultant, John Elkington, that companies, which

 

consider their effects on people, the planet, and profit, are taking into account the full cost of doing

 

business. The idea of 3BL arose from the 1987 Brundtland Report, the document that served as the

 

culmination of an international summit with the goal of uniting to pursue sustainable development

 

(World Commission, 1987). However, it was not until after Elkington's book was published ten years later

 

that the model went viral. Firms began to use these three categories to describe their efforts to be more

 

sustainable and responsible. The Dutch petroleum company, Shell, set this standard, and other firms

 

quickly followed (Idea: Triple Bottom Line, 2009). Researchers have followed the lead of the firms,

 

adopting this framework as a tool for studying CSR (see Lozano and Huisingh, 2011, Rana and Platts,

 

2008 and Silberhorn and Warren, 2007). This framework has some well-documented flaws, particularly

 

pertaining to measurement, category interdependence, and effectiveness in improving compliance with

 

CSR policy (see for example Norman and Macdonald, 2003 and Sridhar and Jones, 2012). However, it is

 

still the mainstream standard for sustainability reporting in many industries (see Raar, 2002), including

 

packaged food (see Wognum et al., 2011). Nikolaou et al. (2013) offer a well-researched theoretical

 

overview of 3BL.

 

The criteria used in this framework are both general and fairly standard among its uses. People is the

 

social category. It is comprised of everything related to how the firms' actions affect people. This

 

includes topics such as health, human rights, safety, fairness, diversity, and others. Planet is the

 

environmental category. It includes everything related to how the firm's actions effect the environment.

 

In this category are topics such as pollution, waste, recycling, environmental protection, and others.

 

Profit is the financial category. It includes everything that concerns the firm's financial well-being. Here

 

we find topics such as growth, marketing, competitiveness, and others. Topics can be categorized across

 

multiple categories if they are related to more than one 3BL category ( Shnayder et al., 2015).

 

Considering the wide use of this framework in categorizing and assessing the responsibility of firms'

 

behaviors, we use the same framework to categorize the motivations behind each of those behaviors.

 

This allows us to contextualize motivations for CSR using a framework that is already well understood

 

and well accepted among firms and organizational behavior researchers. Furthermore, motivations are

 

discussed together with their respective behaviors in the sustainability reports. Given that behaviors are

 

usually tied to 3BL categories, categorizing motivations in the same way allows for simplicity and

 

consistency. Motivations for People-based behaviors are placed in the People category, motivations for

 

Planet-based behaviors are placed in the Planet category, and motivations for Profit-based behavior are

 

placed in the Profit category. Based on this classification, motivations can be divided into two categories,

 

depending on whether they are framed by the firm as values-based or profit-based. All motivations that

 

are framed as being in no way associated with profit, but as stemming from the firm's own intrinsic

 

values are categorized as values-based. All motivations for which firms admit a pathway to monetary

 

gain are categorized as profit-based. 3.2. Explaining CSR motivations: stakeholder management and institutional theory We chose theoretical perspectives that compliment each other's limitations, and through their

 

consistency with our broad definition of CSR, do not infringe on our bottom up approach.

 

We use Institutional Theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991 and Scott, 1995) to identify the types of

 

pressures that firms experience to engage in CSR. IT is a general theory that places strong emphasis on

 

firm behavior as a function of pressures from the firms' environments (Lewin et al., 2004.) We use the

 

flexible structural framework to explore the conditions under which organizations in the packaged food

 

industry are motivated to behave responsibly. This theory has been applied previously to CSR (Campbell,

 

2007 and Jones, 1999) and is the source of our broad definition. In our discussion of the institutions that

 

put pressure on firms, we must also discuss the actors that initiate, strengthen, and break down these

 

institutions ? stakeholders.

 

As previously mentioned, Campbell (2007) offers an institutional perspective of CSR: a term, which he

 

defines using the concept of stakeholders. He attests that researchers in both the CSR and IT bodies of

 

literature recognize that the way that corporations treat their stakeholders depends on the institutions

 

within which they operate, citing some examples (Fligstein and Freeland, 1995 and Hall and Soskice,

 

2001). More recently, Doh and Guay (2006) declare that differences in institutional environments affect

 

the efficacy of specific stakeholders within that institutional context. We take these ideas one step

 

further and agree with Scott (1995) that organizations (both firms and stakeholder groups, in this case)

 

are not only influenced by their institutional context but can also influence it, albeit much less

 

dramatically. We use stakeholder management (Sturdivant, 1979) to identify the stakeholders to which

 

the firm is responsible and the institution-embedded motivations that are instigated or perpetuated by

 

these stakeholders. In practice, the concept of stakeholders as actors often arises in the discussion of the practical

 

implications of institutional pressures on firms (e.g. Doh and Guay, 2006 and Oliver, 1991). Though some

 

researchers see SM and IT as mutually exclusive (e.g. Mitchell et al., 1997 and Husted and Allen, 2006),

 

the two theories are more commonly seen as complimentary (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012), By combining

 

SM and IT, we are able to explain who incites or perpetuates institutional pressures, and how these

 

pressures motivate CSR. 3.2.1. Institutional theory and CSR IT unpacks the effects of influences and pressures from institutions on organizations. Institutions are

 

organized sets of schemas, rules, norms and routines, which become a strong and authoritative set of

 

(often) unwritten rules for behavior. Institutions can influence all aspects of organizational behavior,

 

including those that go beyond profit maximization (Jepperson, 1991 and Scott, 1995). Scott (1995) categorizes institutions based on the manner in which they influence firms: the Regulative

 

pillar, the Normative pillar, and the Cultural-cognitive pillar. The Regulative pillar encompasses

 

institutions that pressure organizational behavior using laws, directives, and other compulsory

 

regulations. In the context of the packaged food industry, these sanctions could come from policy makers

 

at all levels of government or para-statal organizations, and often motivate behaviors with significant

 

public stakes such as health, food safety or non-discriminatory hiring practices. Of regulative institutions,

 

Scott (1995, pg. 62) writes:

 

The institutional logic underlying the regulative pillar is an instrumental one: Individuals craft laws and

 

rules that they believe will advance their interests, and individuals conform to laws and rules because

 

they seek the attendant rewards or wish to avoid sanctions.

 

While governments are the formal law-making bodies, other stakeholders can participate in crafting

 

rules and laws to advance their interests. Stakeholders can create, change, or strengthen regulative

 

institutions by being vocal about their interests. For example, if consumers are interested in improving

 

the nutritional value of a given line of products, they may stage a boycott or contact news outlets,

 

thereby catching the attention of policymakers. They may even initiate a letter-writing campaign to their

 

elected leaders, directly. Action in pursuit of this goal on the part of the consumers could lead to the

 

creation, change, or strengthening of regulative institutions that begin to govern food ingredients more

 

strictly. These types of institutions are very formal. Regulations are usually handed down from an

 

organized and legitimate legislative body. The terms of the regulation are explicit, and the consequences

 

for non-compliance are clear.

 

The Normative pillar often encompasses institutions that encourage organizational behavior using moral

 

or ethical criteria, usually in compliance with external or industry standards. In the context of the

 

packaged food industry, this could include the fulfillment of criteria set by popular certifying bodies such

 

as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), or optin self-regulation such as the EU Pledge ( WFA supports Children's Food and Beverage Advertising

 

Initiative, 2007), which regulates the advertisement of junk food to children. Using the same example as with the Regulative pillar, if the consumers' nutritional interests are become

 

a threat to the firms' collective success, this could prompt normative cooperatives, agreements, or

 

certifications on the part of the industry in order to save face with their customers. These types of

 

institutions are less formal than regulative institutions but do require some level of formality in

 

organization, enforcement of requirements or restrictions, and the potential involvement of third party

 

organizations such as certifying bodies. The Cultural-cognitive pillar encompasses less tangible institutions that encourage organizational

 

behavior with social pressures and conformity. This is a highly tacit category, and includes external

 

pressures based on shared beliefs and taken-for-granted actions. As such, Cultural-cognitive institutions

 

are the least formal of institutions. No official rules are set, and the consequences for non-compliance

 

are not always clear or understood. Institutions from this pillar can encourage isomorphism between

 

firms. As more firms adopt certain behaviors, they become normal or standard, causing the remaining

 

firms to hop on board. This can be demonstrated using the consumer nutrition example from the

 

previous two pillars. As consumers begin to act on their interest in nutrition, other stakeholders may pick

 

up on this and join in with actions of their own. The institutions surrounding nutrition strengthen and

 

organizations begin to succumb to pressures from those institutions by updating their processes to

 

accommodate these new, healthier recipes. As the institutions continue to gain momentum and more

 

organizations engage in this behavior, isomorphism takes over and the new processes become the norm.

 

Scott (1995) elaborates that the Cultural-cognitive pillar serves as the deepest foundation of institutions.

 

Institutions emerge from this pillar to set a cultural precedent, which then guides the Regulative and

 

Normative pillars to adopt and strengthen the institutions. Like all organizations, firms in the packaged food industry are affected by institutions. Because of its size

 

and scope, this industry is on the radar of many government organizations, locally, nationally, and

 

internationally (Brownell and Warner, 2009). Institutions are constantly at play in both the internal and

 

external corporate environment within this (and every other) industry, motivating the affected firms to

 

engage in certain actions ( Scott, 1995). In our discussion of motivations for CSR in the packaged food

 

industry, we use IT as a structural framework, by which we investigate the conditi...

 







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